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On June 23, 1999, the Supreme Court handed down three noteworthy
decisions bearing on the law of constitutional remedies. Alden v. Maine1
struck down an attempt by Congress, acting under its Article I powers, to
subject states to suits in state court on federal statutory grounds. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank2
curbed Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
authorize suits against state governments on constitutional grounds,
reasoning that a case cannot be made for the federal cause of action unless
state law remedies are inadequate. A companion case, College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,3 repudiated
the notion that a state may "constructively" waive its sovereign immunity by
engaging in conduct that is regulated by federal law.
* University of Georgia Law School. The author wishes to thank Richard Nagareda
and the other participants in the symposium for helpful comments on a draft.
I. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
2. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
3. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
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Viewed as decisions about federal-state relations, these cases
demonstrate once again the determination of the contemporary Court's
conservative majority to find ways to shield states from Congress'
regulatory agenda.4 In terms of the allocation of decision making between
federal and state courts, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and College Savings Bank
are the latest in an even longer line of cases, stretching back to Younger v.
Harris,5 in which the post-Warren Supreme Court has, by one means or
another, channeled constitutional litigation to the state courts6 and limited
the remedies available to persons injured by state governments' violations of
federal law.7
While the cases have much in common, a closer inspection reveals that
they are not all cut from the same piece of theoretical cloth. My assigned
topic is the impact of Alden on remedies for constitutional violations. But
Alden cannot be fully understood in isolation. Much can be learned by
examining Florida Prepaid as well, for the Court's treatment of Section 5
probably poses far greater danger than does Alden for an effective system of
constitutional remedies. 8
This Article makes three points. First, contrary to concerns some have
expressed about the implications of Alden, the reasoning of the opinion rests
on the implicit premise that, as a matter of due process, state courts must be
open for certain constitutional claims. This is not an original contribution to
constitutional doctrine.9 But, a footnote in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
4. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (finding that Congress lacks
power under the Commerce Clause to require state law enforcement officers to administer a
federal regulatory scheme); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding that
Congress exceeds its power under the commerce clause when it forbids possession of guns
near schools); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may
not compel the states to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their
borders).
5. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA.
L. REv. 959 (1987); Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191
(1977).
7. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OQ Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984); Kathleen
Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (1991).
8. I have nothing to say about College Savings Bank, except to reiterate my view,
which the Court rejected, see 119 S. Ct. at 2228, that constructive waiver is appropriate where
states have engaged in proprietary activities. See also Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein,
The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073,
1089-1110 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
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Florida10 cast doubt on the authority of Reich, and Alden provides a needed
correction.
My second point addresses the ruling in Florida Prepaid and its
interaction with Alden. Though the Court purported to be applying relatively
uncontroversial principles developed in earlier cases, it in fact forged novel
restrictions on the scope of Congress' Section 5 power. Taken together,
Alden's holding that states enjoy sovereign immunity in their own courts
against suits based on federal law and Florida Prepaid's limits on Congress'
Section 5 power demonstrates that Congress may subject states to suit in the
federal or state courts only when the statute satisfies the Court's new and as
yet undefined conditions for Section 5 legislation.
Third, the similarities between Alden and Florida Prepaid conceal a
difference between the two cases regarding the allocation of power between
Congress and the Supreme Court in the federal system. In its reaffirmation
of Reich, the Alden majority relies on the traditional doctrine that decisions
about the scope of lower federal court jurisdiction are for Congress to make,
with the state courts serving as the ultimate protectors of constitutional
rights in the event Congress takes away federal jurisdiction. Florida Prepaid
diverges from the principle of congressional control. In the course of
determining what is "appropriate" legislation within Section 5, the opinion
sets forth a potentially far-reaching doctrine that may hobble efforts by
Congress to assign litigation over constitutional remedies to the federal
courts. In my view, the Court fails to identify valid reasons why
congressional power over jurisdiction should be any narrower when acting
under Section 5 than in any other context.
I. ALDEN'S REAFFIRMATION OF REICH v. COLLINS
Alden and the Florida Prepaid cases are the latest skirmishes in a long
struggle between two irreconcilable constitutional values. On the one hand is
the "deeply rooted historical tradition of sovereign immunity"; on the other,
the principle that "where there is a right, there must be a remedy."11 Over a
century ago the Supreme Court held in Hans v. Louisiana12 that the
principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment
shields the states from suits for monetary relief in federal court even when
the plaintiff relies on the Federal Constitution. The ruling in Hans presented
a major obstacle to the development of constitutional remedies, obliging the
10. 517 U.S. 44,71 n.14 (1996).
11. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. 134 U.S. 1(1890).
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Court and Congress to find ways to vindicate constitutional rights and to
deter violations while at the same time respecting state sovereign immunity.
As a result, the law of constitutional remedies is understandably complex.
Yet it is also, at least in its broad outlines, well-settled and largely
uncontroversial. The most important case is Ex parte Young, 13 which
authorizes suits for prospective relief against state officers in spite of state
sovereign immunity. Lincoln County v. Luning14 distinguishes suits against
the state from suits against local governments, which do not share the state's
immunity. Monroe v. Pape15 interprets an 1871 statute, now codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as authorizing a cause of action for damages or injunctive
relief against officers who violate constitutional rights, though they are
immune from paying damages unless the right was "clearly established" at
the time of the violation. 16 Since Monroe, the Court has held that local
governments may be sued under § 198317 and that they have no immunity, 1 8
but that they may be sued only when their "official policy" or custom causes
the violation. 19
The big gap in the coverage of § 1983 and Ex parte Young is any
provision for suits against state governments, as distinguished from suits
against their officers. Suing an officer is a satisfactory substitute when one
seeks to stop a continuing or threatened violation by obtaining an injunction
or a declaratory judgment. But a problem arises when the violation is partly
or wholly in the past, so that a recovery of money is the only way to fully
13. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Two important later cases should be noted: Edelman v
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (stressing that the relief must be prospective and that
retrospective relief is unavailable, even if it is styled as an equitable remedy); and Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that even prospective
injunctive relief may not be granted on state law grounds).
14. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (officers carrying out the
executive functions of government are immune from liability for damages unless they violate
"clearly established" law). In addition, officers engaged in judicial and legislative functions
are absolutely immune from suits for damages. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 47
(1998) (legislative immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity).
Further, prosecutors are absolutely immune for some of their actions and qualifiedly immune
for others. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1169-70 (4th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER].
17. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
19. Monell limited municipal liability in this way. Later cases have struggled to define
the contours of "official policy." See, e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1129-31.
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vindicate one's rights. In that event, the suit against the officer may not
work, either because of the official immunity doctrine, because the officer is
judgment proof, or because the Court may declare that the case is "really"
against the state.20 In certain circumstances, notably with respect to
constitutional challenges to state taxation,2 1 the Ex Parte Young and § 1983
remedies are foreclosed by judicial or statutory exceptions to the coverage
of those remedies.
A. Implying a Cause ofAction Directly From the Constitution
One solution to the sovereign immunity problem is for courts to
recognize a cause of action implied directly from the Constitution against
state governments. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics Agents,22 the Court ruled that, despite the absence of a
statute broadly authorizing suits against federal officers on constitutional
grounds, the victim of an illegal search could sue federal law enforcement
officers for violation of the Fourth Amendment. 23 Though Bivens
established the crucial principle that a cause of action for damages may be
implied directly from the Constitution, the holding is not sufficient by itself
to support suits against states for damages. Sovereign immunity was not an
obstacle to the cause of action recognized in Bivens, for the state's immunity
does not extend to officers.
A later case, McKesson Corp. v. Division ofABT,24 took another step in
the direction of recognizing a constitutionally-based cause of action against
state governments. The plaintiff sued Florida to recover illegally collected
taxes and to enjoin enforcement of the tax law, in the wake of an earlier
20. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); see also John
C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47,
60-62 (1998).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (prohibiting federal injunctions against state tax
collection if a state remedy is available); see also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 16, at
1216-20, 1227-28.
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. Much of the Court's opinion was devoted to showing why a common law tort suit
was an inadequate substitute for a federal cause of action. See 403 U.S. at 391-95. Concurring
in the judgment, Justice Harlan noted that there is precedent for such a cause of action in the
long-standing availability of federal equitable relief, see id. at 400-01 (Harlan, J. concurring),
that for some victims of constitutional violations "it is damages or nothing," see id. at 410,
and that "the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional interests," see id. at 407, rather than leaving their enforcement solely to the
legislature.
24. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
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Supreme Court decision that struck down a scheme like that of Florida's on
Commerce Clause grounds.25 The state court granted the injunction but
refused to award a refund, and the Supreme Court reversed, declaring:
If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and
relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the
tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify
any unconstitutional deprivation.2
6
But the Court did not address the argument that the state's sovereign
immunity may block recovery, because the state courts had "accepted
jurisdiction over this suit"27 and did not rely on sovereign immunity in
denying monetary relief. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court cited "equitable
considerations" in support of its refusal to award a refund.28 After
McKesson it remained possible to argue that sovereign immunity would
overcome the due process obligation recognized in that case.
Reich v. Collins29 seemed to put the issue to rest once and for all. In
Reich, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the proposition, established by "a long
line of cases," and reiterated in McKesson, "[D]ue process requires a clear
and certain remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law."' 30 The
25. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
26. 496 U.S. at 31.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. The Florida Supreme Court cited two "equitable considerations" in support of its
ruling. One was that the tax was levied "in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid
statute," which suggests that a refund obligation may "undermine the State's ability to engage
in sound fiscal planning." Id. at 44. The Supreme Court found this concern insufficiently
"weighty in these circumstances" to warrant the refusal of a refund, given other measures
available to the state to avoid disruption. Id. at 45. Second, the state court ha[d] maintained
that a refund would amount to a "windfall" to McKesson, because "the cost of the tax had
likely been passed on to its customers." Id. at 46. But, the Supreme Court responded that this
line of reasoning missed the point: 'The tax injured petitioner not only because it left
petitioner poorer ... but also because it placed petitioner at a relative disadvantage in the
marketplace vis-,-vis competitors distributing preferred local products." Id. at 48.
29. 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
30. Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ann Woolhandler
maintains that, in the distant past, "[t]he requirement of a remedy... for taxes that violate the
Federal Constitution.. . is not one that the Court historically forced on the states by way of
suits against the states themselves. The baseline required remedies were typically ones that
ran against the individual, not the state." Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 150 (1997). Be that as it may, she
[Vol. 31:771776
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Court acknowledged that Eleventh Amendment immunity "does generally
bar tax refund claims from being brought in [a federal] forum," but sharply
distinguished between federal and state court. The state's Fourteenth
Amendment obligation to provide a state court remedy exists, "the sovereign
immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding." 31
The taxpayer may not be forced to either pay the tax without complaint or
else raise constitutional issues in defense of a criminal prosecution. The
constitutional obligation is not, strictly speaking, to provide a refund action.
It is to provide an effective remedy. This remedy may take the form of a pre-
deprivation hearing on the validity of the tax. Alternatively, the state may
penalize pre-deprivation recalcitrance and instead provide a refund action
after the exaction. Georgia, however, had "held out what plainly appeared to
be a 'clear and certain' postdeprivation remedy.., and then declared, [only
after the disputed taxes had been paid,] that no such remedy exists."'32 This,
the state "may not do."'33
Because Reich and McKesson are tax cases and there are no cases like
them in most other constitutional contexts, 34 one may read them as stating a
narrow principle that applies only to unconstitutional tax collection and not
to other constitutional violations that produce injuries giving rise to requests
for damages. 35 But this reading ignores both the reasoning in the opinions
and the context in which these tax cases arise. The Court's justification for
imposing on the state courts a due process obligation to provide a remedy is
not unique to tax collection. It is that "exaction of a tax constitutes a
deprivation of property."'36 That is why "the State must provide procedural
safeguards against unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of
the Due Process Clause." 37 This reasoning applies equally to any
deprivation of the rights to property and liberty protected by the Fourteenth
acknowledges that, one way or the other, the states were required to provide a remedy. See id.
at 150-54.
31. 513 U.S. at 110.
32. Id. at Ill.
33. Id. at 108.
34. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment "dictates the remedy for
interference with property rights amounting to a taking," i.e., an award of money for the loss
of value. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 316 n.9 (1987).
35. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 173, 1784-85 n.283 (1991).




Amendment, including all of the Bill of Rights that apply to the states
through that Amendment.
The relevance of the tax context is that, on account of the states'
exceedingly strong interest in financial stability in this context, [the Court
has] long held that a State may employ various financial sanctions and
summary remedies, such as distress sales, in order to encourage taxpayers to
make timely payments prior to resolution of any dispute over the validity of
the tax assessment.38
Not only does the state "ha[ve] the flexibility to provide [a] remedy before
the disputed taxes are paid... , after they are paid.. . , or both," 39 but
federal remedies are also shut off. The tax injunction act explicitly forbids
federal court injunctions of state taxes where a state remedy is available, 40
and Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute, or applying the
principle of deference it reflects, have foreclosed other types of federal and
state court relief.4 1 The constitutionally-implied remedy issue arises in the
tax context and not elsewhere because other remedies, including § 1983
suits, are typically available for other constitutional violations, while a state
court refund action, implied directly from the Due Process Clause, may be
the only recourse for unconstitutionally collected state taxes.
B. The Specter of Consent
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,42 the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity in the federal courts
when acting under its Article I powers. Though the issue in Seminole Tribe
was the scope of congressional authority, one footnote in the opinion raised
the possibility that the Court had had second thoughts about the scope of
Reich. The troubling footnote is located in a section of the opinion in which
the Court describes and responds to a passage in Justice Souter's dissent, in
38. Id. at37.
39. Reich, 513 U.S. at 108.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1341.
41. See, e.g., National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S.
582 (1995) (finding that section 1983 suits to challenge state taxes may not be brought in
state court for either damages or injunctive relief); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U.S. 393 (1982) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1341 bars declaratory judgments); Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (stating that damages actions are not
available in federal court under § 1983).
42. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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which he argued for a broad congressional power to abrogate in order to
assure the supremacy of federal law.43 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that there are "other methods of ensuring the States'
compliance with federal law," including suits by the federal government and
suits against state officers. 44 He added, "[T]his Court is empowered to
review a question of federal law arising from a state-court decision where a
State has consented to suit."45
Though the Court did not cite Reich,46 much less explicitly call that case
into question, some commentators have suggested that it may have intended
to undermine the "no sovereign immunity against constitutional claims"
reading of Reich. The most vigorous exponent of this view is Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, who maintains that the Seminole Tribe footnote may mean that the
Reich opinion does not tell the whole story of sovereign immunity against
implied causes of action.47 In Reich itself, Georgia did not raise sovereign
immunity as a defense, relying instead on the purported availability of a pre-
deprivation remedy, a ploy the Court rejected as a bait-and-switch tactic. 48
The Seminole Tribe footnote, as Vazquez views the case, nullifies the notion
that states may, as a matter of constitutional right, be sued for damages in
the state courts. The footnote implies that they may be sued only with their
consent.49 If Vazquez is right, the Seminole Tribe footnote undermines the
use of implied causes of action in the state courts for obtaining monetary
relief against state governments.
43. See id. at 157 (Souter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 71 n.14.
45. Id.
46. The Court cited Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), where it first
held that appeals to the Supreme Court from state judgments in suits involving the state were
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
47. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?,
106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
48. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 58.
49. See Vazquez, supra note 47, at 1717-20. Professor Vazquez does not state the
proposition as baldly as I have done. This is the necessary implication of Vazquez's
contention that, under the Seminole footnote and its treatment of Cohens, the Eleventh
Amendment forbids Supreme Court review of a state judgment in such a case unless the state
has consented to suit. See also RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 62 (Supp.
1999) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER, Supp.]. For a different perspective on the Seminole
Tribe footnote, see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception ", 110 HARV.




C. Alden on Reich
Although Seminole Tribe cut off access to the federal courts for federal
statutory causes of action against state governments, the reasoning of the
opinion left open the possibility that such suits could be brought in state
court. In support of its ruling in favor of the states' immunity, for example,
the Court asserted, "For over a century, we have grounded our decisions in
the oft-repeated understanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential
part of the Eleventh Amendment,"' 50 which, of course, only protects the
states from federal court suits.
Alden addressed the issue of whether Congress, acting under its Article I
powers, could authorize suits in state court. In holding that the constitutional
principle of state sovereign immunity barred suits under the Federal Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Court had to distinguish several earlier cases
that seemed to permit state court suits against state governments. One of
these was Reich. The Court said:
In Reich v. Collins, we held that, despite its immunity from suit in federal
court, a State which holds out what plainly appears to be a clear and certain
postdeprivation remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law may
not declare, after disputed taxes have been paid in reliance on this remedy,
that the remedy does not in fact exist. This case arose in the context of tax-
refund litigation, where a State may deprive a taxpayer of all other means of
challenging the validity of its tax laws by holding out what appears to be a
clear and certain postdeprivation remedy. In this context, due process
requires the State to provide the remedy it has promised. The obligation
arises from the Constitution itself; Reich does not speak to the power of
Congress to subject States to suits in their own courts. 51
Whatever one thinks of Alden, nothing in its rejection of congressional
power to subject states to suit in state court bears directly on the cause of
action implied directly from the Constitution in Reich. Alden ruled that the
states enjoy a substantive immunity from suit on federal statutory grounds.
Reich held that, on account of the federal policy of channeling constitutional
challenges to state taxes to the state courts, those courts must provide either
a pre-deprivation or a post-deprivation remedy.
David Shapiro is bothered by the Alden Court's description of Reich. He
points out, "[T]he majority states that the case stands only for the
50. 517 U.S. at 67.
51. 119 S. Ct. at 2259 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
[Vol. 31:771
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proposition that when state law appears to provide a tax refund remedy (and
only a refund remedy), the 'Constitution itself' (i.e., the Due Process
Clause) requires the state to provide the remedy it has promised."' 52 Coupled
with the troubling footnote in Seminole Tribe,53 the Alden Court's
characterization of Reich raises the question of whether the Court has
backed away from the Reich opinion. Thus, Professor Shapiro is concerned
that Alden's reference to the bait-and-switch problem may "suggest that the
state could plead sovereign immunity in its own courts if no state remedy
appeared to be available and the doors of the federal courts were similarly
closed."54
This worry seems to me to be misplaced. The Seminole Tribe footnote is
a response to an argument that, without the option of authorizing private
causes of action in the federal courts, Congress would be unable to enforce
federal statutes. The Chief Justice's observation that states can be sued in
state court with their consent-and the implication that they cannot be sued
there otherwise-foreshadows the holding in Alden as to statutorily-based
causes of action. But it does not have any necessary implications for Reich's
constitutionally-based cause of action. The Court's assertion in Reich that
states must provide a refund remedy for taxes collected by compulsion, "the
sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts
notwithstanding," 55 may be unnecessary to the decision in that case, but it
was backed up by a string of citations.
To the Court's critics, there may seem to be little difference between the
cause of action the states were obliged to provide in Reich and the one they
were allowed to deny in Alden. As they conceive of federal-state relations,
the issue in both cases is whether states are accountable in the state courts
under federal law. Rightly or wrongly,56 the current conservative majority
takes a different view of the allocation of power in the federal system. Its
members distinguish between constitutional liberties held by individuals,
which they remain willing to enforce against state governments, and
regulation of state governments by Congress, which they find increasingly
suspect.57
52. HART AND WECHSLER, Supp., supra note 49, at 135.
53. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
54. HART AND WECHSLER, Supp., supra note 49, at 135.
55. 513 U.S. at 109-10.
56. For reasons discussed in Part 111, 1 think the Court has made an unwise choice in
deciding to protect the states against Congress.
57. See cases cited supra note 4. Note, however, that in Florida Prepaid, where both
individual rights and congressional power were at issue-the question was the scope of
2000]
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As for Alden's description of Reich, the Alden Court did emphasize the
impermissibility of "hold[ing] out what plainly appears to be a clear "and
certain postdeprivation remedy" and then "declar[ing], after disputed taxes
have been paid in reliance on this remedy, that the remedy does not in fact
exist."'58 But the premise behind striking down the bait-and-switch tactic is
not "only" that the taxpayer's reliance must be respected. It is that the state
(a) has a constitutional obligation to provide a remedy for unconstitutional
tax collection and (b) has a choice as to whether that remedy comes before
or after the taxes are collected; but (c) must provide a remedy at some point
in time. Thus, "in the context of tax-refund litigation, . . . a State may
deprive a taxpayer of all other means of challenging the validity of its tax
laws by holding out what appears to be a clear and certain postdeprivation
remedy. ' 59 Reich's holding that the state, as a matter of due process, must
provide one remedy or the other remains intact.
Neither Seminole Tribe nor Alden speak to the content of the
constitutional right recognized in Reich, which remains somewhat uncertain.
Two aspects of this problem need to be distinguished. First, some violations
of federal law by a state are constitutional violations and others are not. A
state does not commit a constitutional violation every time it violates federal
law and causes damage as a result.60 Thus, Maine's failure to pay wages
owed to workers under the FLSA may or may not be a "taking" and it may
or may not be a deprivation of property without due process of law,
depending on how the Court interprets the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 1 The
real-world impact of Alden turns on the answer to this question. If the state's
failure to pay is a Fourteenth Amendment violation, then the question of
whether Congress may authorize suits to recover the wages depends on
whether, in the circumstances, Congress' authorization is within the scope of
its Section 5 power. That topic is addressed in Part II. Under Reich, a
remedy ought to be available in state court in any event.
Second, suppose a constitutional wrong is established, as where taxes
are collected in violation of a constitutional prohibition. There may be good
reasons, such as the novelty of a constitutional requirement or the
Congress' power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights-the Court sided with the state.
See infra Part II.
58. 119 S. Ct. at 2259 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2209 (finding that negligent deprivations of
property are not constitutional violations).
61. Cf. HART AND WECHSLER, Supp., supra note 49, at 135 (suggesting that the failure
to pay such wages may be a deprivation of property without due process).
[Vol. 31:771
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availability of another means of correcting the constitutional violation, for
according the state a defense to the refund action.62 In this regard, keep in
mind that many constitutional wrongs committed by police officers and
other officials go unremedied every day on account of the official immunity
doctrine.
II. SECTION 5 SUITS IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
Aside from the implied cause of action recognized in Reich, another way
around state sovereign immunity is provided by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which grants Congress the power to enforce the Amendment's
substantive provisions "by appropriate legislation. 63 In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,64 the Supreme Court held that Congress may, acting under Section 5,
authorize suits by private individuals against state governments to recover
damages for violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights, even though such
suits would be "constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." 65 The
case concerned Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes
suits for damages against employers who discriminate on the basis of race,
gender, and other grounds. Acting under its Section 5 power, Congress had
expanded the coverage of Title VII's prohibitions on race and sex
discrimination by amending the statute's coverage to include state and local
"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 66 In
Fitzpatrick male employees of the state of Connecticut charged that the
62. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1068, 1092-94 (1998) (distinguishing between the individual right to a
remedy, which may be denied if there is justification for doing so, and the need for a system
of constitutional remedies that will adequately deter violations, which is essential to
constitutional liberty). Standing in the way of such a rule is Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), a tax refund case where the Court rejected "non-retroactivity"
of new constitutional rulings. There may be a difference, however, between the retroactivity
issue addressed in Harper and the question of what is an appropriate remedy. See HART AND
WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 853; Monaghan, supra note 47. Recall, too, that McKesson took
seriously the state court's reasons for not awarding the refund, though it ultimately rejected
both of them. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 44. On a different set of facts, similar arguments
may succeed.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
64. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (finding that
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, enacted under
Congress Section 5 power, is a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
65. 427 U.S. at 456.
66. See id. at 448-49 & n.2.
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state's retirement plan discriminated against them.67 Rejecting the state's
sovereign immunity defense, the Supreme Court allowed the suit.68 The
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment had worked a "shift in the
federal-state balance [that] has been carried forward by more recent
decisions of th[e] Court."69 It ruled that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."'70
In principle at least, Fitzpatrick co-exists comfortably with Hans, since
Hans located the immunity in the original Constitution and Fitzpatrick ruled
only that later amendments may abrogate that immunity.
This means of recovering damages from the states was severely
undercut by the Court's decision three years later in Quern v. Jordan.71
Section 1983 provides for suit against any "person" who, acting under color
of state law, violates constitutional rights. 72 Monell v. Department of Social
Services73 had held that municipal governments are "persons" subject to suit
under § 1983. This, combined with the Section 5 ruling in Fitzpatrick,
seemed to open the federal courts to suits against states for monetary relief.
The Court in Quern ruled otherwise, however, on the ground that:
[section 1983] does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face
an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a
history which focuses directly on the question of state liability and which
shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the States.74
Seizing on the Court's reference to the Eleventh Amendment, which by its
terms only forbids suits in federal courts, the plaintiff in Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police75 sued in state court. He argued that Quern's
requirement of a clear statement should not apply in state court because the
constitutional provision that justified the requirement does not apply to state
court suits. 76 Though the Court did not squarely address this
67. Id. at 447-48.
68. Id. at 448.
69. Id. at 455.
70. Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
71. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
73. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
74. 440 U.S. at 345.
75. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
76. Id.
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argument, 7 7 it held that states are not "persons" within the meaning of
§ 1983 for purposes of state court suits. 78
A. Section 5 Becomes Critical: Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 79 held
that Congress may override state sovereign immunity and subject states to
suits for damages, whether it acts under its Section 5 power or some other
power such as the Commerce Clause.80 The constitutional issue in Union
Gas was whether a state government could be sued for damages under a
federal environmental protection statute that imposed cleanup costs on
polluters and named states as "persons" who may be held liable. 81 Because
the statute was enacted under Congress' Commerce Clause power and could
not plausibly be defended as an exercise of Section 5 power, the Court could
not rely solely on Fitzpatrick.82 Writing for a plurality of four, Justice
Brennan resorted to a different theory altogether, stressing that the states had
given up some of their immunity by ratifying the original Constitution.
Justice Brennan reasoned:
[B]ecause the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the
same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power
thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States
liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress
the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity
where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render
them liable. 83
77. Id. at 64-65.
78. Id. at 62-71.
79. 491 U.S. I (1989).
80. Id. at 23.
81. The intent to impose liability on states was sufficiently unclear to enable four
justices to dissent from it, see id. at 45-56 (White, J., dissenting), but for present purposes it is
appropriate to assume that the holding on this point was correct.
82. Though the plurality makes extensive use of Fitzpatrick as an instance of
congressional abrogation, see id. at 15-18 (plurality opinion), Justice Scalia, in dissent, points
out the difference between the Section 5 power and the Commerce Clause and shows that
Fitzpatrick's rationale does not apply to Union Gas. See id. at 41-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 19-20 (plurality opinion). The plurality was joined by Justice White, who




Under this theory, Congress may take the immunity away whenever it acts
under any of its powers, and it is unnecessary to ask whether a given statute
was enacted pursuant to Section 5.
The plurality purported not to have overruled Hans, observing that Hans
did not address the issue of whether Congress may abrogate the immunity.
The effect of Union Gas was, however, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent,
to "contradict[] the rationale of Hans, if not its narrow holding." 84 Little is
left of state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle if Congress
may override it. After Union Gas, Congress enacted a number of statutes
authorizing suits for damages against state governments, including
bankruptcy legislation,85 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 86 and the Patent Remedy87 Act, which was successfully
challenged in Florida Prepaid.88
In his dissent to Union Gas, Justice Scalia predicted that the champions
of state liability had won only an "unstable victory." 89 He was proved right
seven years later when the Court returned to the problem of state sovereignimmunity in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,90 which overruled Union
Gas but upheld Fitzpatrick. In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"),
Congress, acting under its Article I power to regulate Indian commerce, had
obliged the states to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes on the
regulation of Indian gambling establishments and had authorized Indian
tribes to sue states who failed to negotiate in good faith.9 1 Striking down the
statute, the Court drew a sharp distinction between Congress' Section 5
power and its Article I powers, flatly repudiating congressional power to
abrogate under Article 1.92 The rationale of Fitzpatrick, it explained, is
"wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause.' 93 Reiterating the
84. Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. See I I U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994). Cases bearing on this provision are discussed in
Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual Property
by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 849, 891-95 (1998).
86. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). A challenge to this legislation was recently
decided by the Court. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), the Court
ruled that the legislation exceeded Congress' Section 5 power.
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (1994).
88. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
89. 491 U.S. at 45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
91. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), (B)(i) (1994).
92. 517 U.S. at 45.
93. Id. at 65.
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distinction made by Justice Scalia in his Union Gas dissent, the Court
maintained, "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution,
operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power
achieved by Article m and the Eleventh Amendment." 94
For two decades, between the Fitzpatrick ruling in 1976 and the
Seminole Tribe decision in 1996, the issue of how far Congress could go
under Section 5 lurked in the background. Now it took center stage. It once
again became necessary to delineate the scope of Congress' power under
Section 5, for the validity of an abrogation of state sovereign immunity once
again depended on whether the statute in question was an appropriate
exercise of Section 5 power. If that power is read broadly, monetary awards
will be available more often.
A year after Seminole Tribe, the Court began to address the scope of
Congress' Section 5 power in a case that arose outside the Eleventh
Amendment context. City ofBoerne v. Flores95 was a challenge to a federal
statute enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.96 The Court in Smith had upheld Oregon's denial of
unemployment benefits to persons who used peyote as a religious sacrament,
turning away a challenge based on the Free Exercise Clause. It laid down a
rule that "neutral generally applicable laws" may ordinarily be applied to
religious rituals without offending the Free Exercise Clause.97 Congress,
purporting to act under its Section 5 power, then passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which forbid the government from
"substantially burden[ing] the exercise of religion," even by a law of general
applicability, unless it can show that the regulation is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 98
In Flores, the Court struck down the statute insofar as it imposes
requirements on the states.99 Characterizing the Section 5 power as
"remedial," the Court distinguished between steps that "remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions" and those that attempt to "decree the substance of
94. Id. at 65-66.
95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
96. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
97. See id. at 878-82.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (1994).
99. Because Congress did not rely upon Section 5 in regulating the national
government, a number of courts have applied it to federal agencies even after Flores. See,
e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 175 & n.I (3d Cir. 1999).
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the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."'1 00 "[C]hanging
what the right is,"'10 1 as Congress did in according religious organizations
broader protection than they received under Smith, goes beyond the Section
5 power to "enforce, by appropriate legislation."'102 Yet Flores did not lay
down a blanket rule against all federal statutes aimed at preventing state
practices that pass constitutional muster. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
forbids the use of literacy tests in certain states and authorizes suits against
states to enforce the prohibition, even though the Court had upheld the use
of such tests several years earlier. 103 In Flores, the Court reaffirmed its
decisions upholding the Voting Rights Act, but distinguished that statute
from RFRA. 1°4 In the Voting Rights cases, there was "evidence in the
record reflecting the subsisting and pervasive discriminatory-and therefore
unconstitutional-use of literacy tests,"'1 5 which made "[t]he new,
unprecedented remedies . . . necessary given the ineffectiveness of the
existing voting rights laws."'106 There must, however, "be a congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved."' 107 The prohibition
contained in RFRA is unjustified under Section 5 because the "legislative
record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws
passed because of religious bigotry." 108 Even if such a problem were
identified, the statute was too broadly conceived to meet the Section 5
standard of appropriate remedial legislation. As the court wrote, "RFRA is
so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior." 109
100. 521 U.S. at 519-20 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 519.
102. Id. at 517.
103. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (holding that a
North Carolina constitutional requirement for all voters, irrespective of color or race, to pass a
literacy test did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
104. 521 U.S. at 525.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 530.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 532.
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B. Limiting the Reach of Section 5
While Alden reaffirms the availability of a state forum for damage
claims granted in the United States Constitution, Florida Prepaid1 10
narrowed the scope of Congress' Section 5 power. The issue was the validity
of the Patent Remedy Act, I I1 which had authorized suits against state
governments to obtain damages for patent infringement. 112 The Court struck
down the statute.113 Characterizing the Flores test as a requirement that
Congress "must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying
or preventing such conduct,''114 it noted that "Congress identified no pattern
of patent infringement by the States,"1 15 that may warrant federal
intervention. Moreover, even if such a pattern had been shown, this would
not necessarily have justified Congress' action, for "a State's infringement
of a patent . . .does not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only
where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured
patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of
property without due process result." 116
Accordingly, the validity of the Patent Remedy Act depended upon a
showing that state remedies were inadequate. Yet, "Congress .. . said
nothing about the existence or adequacy of state remedies in the statute or in
the Senate Report, and made only a few fleeting references to state remedies
in the House Report .... "117 Quoting the proportionality standard of
Flores, the Court concluded, "[T]he provisions of the Patent Remedy Act
are 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that
110. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). In the companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), the Court held
that the rights protected by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which include the right
to be free from false advertising and the right to be secure in one's business interests, are not
"property" covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress may not protect these
rights under its Section 5 power. The Court also ruled that the states do not waive their
sovereign immunity by engaging in commercial activities. See College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at
2228.
111. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy
Act), Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a)
(1994 ed. and Supp. 111)).
112. See 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
113. Seeid. at2211.
114. Id. at 2207.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2208 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 2209.
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[they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. "' 118
Notice, however, that in the guise of applying Flores, the Court actually
transforms and enlarges Flores' restrictions on Congress. The problem in
Flores was that Congress had not merely authorized a remedy; it had
defined the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion more broadly
than the Supreme Court had. 119 Flores acknowledged that .Congress, acting
under Section 5, may prohibit state action that is constitutionally valid, but
only if there is "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 120 Because
Congress had made no showing of widespread violations of religious
freedom, RFRA failed to meet the proportionality test. 121
The weakness of the Florida Prepaid opinion is not merely that the case
curbed Congress' Section 5 power more severely than Flores had done, but
that its normative basis is not applicable to the circumstances of Florida
Prepaid, leaving the latter ruling unsupported by either precedent or policy.
In justifying its nullification of RFRA, the Flores court looked to the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which demonstrated "the
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause."' 122 The
first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment had, in effect, granted Congress the
power to define constitutional rights. But this notion was rejected for giving
"Congress too much legislative power at the expense of the existing
constitutional structure." 123 Subsequently, the current version, which grants
remedial power to Congress and thus "maintain[s] the traditional separation
of powers between Congress and the Judiciary," 124 was adopted in its place.
The traditional role of the judiciary in defining constitutional rights, as
well as the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, may furnish persuasive
reasons for striking down RFRA. Florida Prepaid is an altogether different
kind of case, however, for the Patent Remedy Act really was remedial. Prior
cases have held, and Florida Prepaid reiterated, that patents are "surely
included within the 'property' of which no person may be deprived by a
State without due process of law."' 125 The statute merely granted a remedy
118. Id. at 2210 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 532).
119. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
120. 521 U.S. at 520.
121. Seeid. at 532.
122. Id. at 520.
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 523-24.
125. 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
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for deprivations of this property. Congress did not attempt to redefine
constitutional rights, though it may have gone too far in allowing suits for
negligent infringement. 126 The possible use of this statute to remedy
negligent infringements was not before the Court, as College Savings Bank
alleged a deliberate infringement. 127 The historical analysis and separation
of powers concerns that underlie Flores thus have little, if any, weight here.
C. The Implications ofFlorida Prepaid
The unmistakable holding of Florida Prepaid is that Congress may not
simply authorize suits against states for constitutional violations without
first making findings that will satisfy the Court that there is a significant
problem of state compliance with the constitution and an absence of
effective state remedies for those violations. But the precise scope of the
Court's limits on Congress' Section 5 power will remain unclear until they
are tested in future cases. In particular, the Court will face the issues of just
how strong a showing of state violations and just how strong a showing of
inadequacy of state remedies will be necessary to meet the test of
"appropriate" Section 5 legislation. It is doubtful whether such questions can
ever be answered without highly subjective and intrusive inquiries of the
sort the Court rejected when, in Monroe v. Pape,128 it held that § 1983
authorizes a cause of action, whether or not state remedies are adequate. 129
However these questions are resolved, one consequence of Florida Prepaid
should be evident: the case makes it less likely that any given effort by
Congress to provide litigants access to the federal courts for suits against
states will be successful.
Given the limits placed by Florida Prepaid on Congress' Section 5
power, and given Alden's rule that sovereign immunity protects states
against federal claims in their own courts, what implications do these cases,
taken together, have for the power of Congress to subject states to suit in
their own courts? As I understand the cases, everything depends on whether
a given statute is a valid exercise of Congress' Section 5 power. Others may
126. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that negligent
deprivation of liberty is not a substantive due process violation).
127. See 119 S. Ct. at 2213 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
129. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1120. If the test of adequacy is
whether state remedies are administered fairly enough to satisfy standard principles of due
process, I suspect that they will generally pass the test.
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have a different view. For example, Justice Stevens, writing in dissent for
himself and three others in Florida Prepaid, observed,
[E]ven if 28 U.S.C. § 1338 is amended or construed to permit state courts to
entertain infringement actions when a State is named as a defendant, given
the Court's opinion in Alden v. Maine... it is by no means clear that state
courts could be required to hear these cases at all. 130
Unless the proposed statute includes congressional findings that would
satisfy the Florida Prepaid majority of the need for a remedy under federal
law, it seems to me altogether clear that the state courts could not be
required to hear such cases. The very holding of Alden is that Congress may
not deprive states of their immunity from suit in the state courts when acting
under its Article I powers. Since Alden reaffirms Fitzpatrick,131 it is equally
clear that Alden does not stand in the way of an effort by Congress to subject
states to suit in the state or federal courts for violators of the Fourteenth
Amendment, assuming Congress meets the Florida Prepaid requirements,
whatever they may be. 132
M. CONGRESS, THE STATE COURTS, AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Florida Prepaid and Alden both reflect the Supreme Court's preference
for the state courts as the forum for litigation seeking damages against state
governments. In my view, however, the two cases have less in common than
meets the eye. Underlying the holdings are two radically different
conceptions of the proper allocation of power in the federal system. Both
raise the issue of Congress' role in deciding whether constitutional claims
should be heard by the state or federal courts. Florida Prepaid, with its gloss
on the requirements for "appropriate" Section 5 legislation, puts a new and
potentially'serious obstacle in the way of congressional efforts to allocate
jurisdiction to the federal courts. Though Alden does not directly address the
scope of congressional power over jurisdiction, its reaffirmation of Reich
130. 119 S. Ct. at 2216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
131. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
132. Doemberg and Wingate suggest, "Alden leaves open the question of whether
Congress could authorize state court actions for claims stemming ultimately from § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH WINGATE, 1999 TEACHER'S
UPDATE TO FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 4 (1999). Their point
seems to be that, in principle, there may be some other ground on which state courts may
have a valid excuse for refusing to hear constitutionally-based suits against them. But the
possible existence of such a reason has nothing to do with Alden.
[Vol. 31:771
SUING STATES FOR MONEY
implicitly recognizes the paramount role of Congress in setting the scope of
federal jurisdiction with the concomitant role of the state courts serving as
the forum of last resort for constitutional claims. Thus, Reich's rule that a
state court must afford a damages remedy, notwithstanding sovereign
immunity, rests on two premises. It is justified in part by the constitutional
imperative that a remedy be available at some time in some forum. But an
equally essential premise for the state court cause of action recognized in
Reich is that Congress may validly bar taxpayer access to the federal courts,
as it has by the tax injunction act.
Because I favor a principle of strong "Congressional control over
jurisdiction,"' 133 I believe that this difference between Florida Prepaid and
Alden is an important consideration in evaluating their respective merits.
Whatever the soundness of the Court's decision in Alden to block suits
seeking to enforce federal statutes, the Alden opinion deserves credit for its
fidelity to Reich and the constitutionally-based cause of action recognized
there. By contrast, the Section 5 ruling in Florida Prepaid is both dubious as
a matter of principle and unworkable in practice. In its zeal to defend states'
rights, the Court has ignored a basic principle of judicial federalism.
A. Congress' Power to Allocate Jurisdiction Between Federal and State
Courts
A perennial issue in the law of the federal courts is the scope of
Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
Usually, the issue arises in connection with statutory limits on federal
jurisdiction over constitutional issues. Though scholars have argued for
restrictions on Congress's power, 134 the Supreme Court consistently has
held that Congress may allocate jurisdiction between the federal and state
courts as it sees fit, 13 5 and most of the academic critics argue only that
either a federal district court or the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
133. See Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 465 (1991).
134. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of
Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75; Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal
Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 335 (1988).
135. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973); Lockerty v.
Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850); see
also Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
ViLL. L. REv. 1030 (1982).
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"some or all of the heads of jurisdiction specified in Article III."136 In a
sense, the holding in Reich is simply a corollary of the power of Congress to
restrict lower federal court jurisdiction. A state taxpayer cannot take his
complaint to federal court on account of the Tax Injunction Act 137 and
judicial decisions that implement a shared "aversion to federal interference
with state tax administration" 138 among Congress and the Court. 139 Because
the Due Process Clause requires an effective remedial scheme for
constitutional violations, the state courts must be available, either before or
after the taxes are collected. Reich vindicates Henry Hart's thesis that, on
account of Congress' broad power over federal jurisdiction, "[i]n the scheme
of the Constitution, [the state courts] are the primary guarantors of
constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones." 140
From the perspective of vigorous enforcement of constitutional rights, it
may seem perverse to treat state courts as their "primary guarantors." For a
variety of reasons, federal courts as a whole probably have more sympathy
for constitutional claims, as well as more competence in adjudicating them,
than do the state courts, and the disparity between federal and state courts
surely makes a difference in close cases. 141 At the same time, the structure
of the federal system favors Hart's view. Despite the Article III tenure and
salary provisions, federal courts are inevitably vulnerable to encroachments
of one kind or another from the other branches, such as a sustained effort
over time to change their rulings by changing their composition, or the
channeling of adjudication away from Article III courts and into
administrative agencies or legislative courts, whose members lack tenure
136. Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2566-67 n. 158 (1998) (citations omitted).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
138. National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 586
(1995).
139. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
140. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1401 (1953). The force of this
principle depends on the availability and the fairness of the state forum. In the event a state
court does not provide a full and fair hearing for constitutional claims, a federal court should
be available. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980); Michael Collins, The
Right to Avoid Trial: Justi fying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Court
Proceedings, 66 N.C. L. REV. 49, 54-72, 78-91 (1987). If Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
397, 409-10 (1872), which seems to preclude state habeas corpus for federal prisoners, is still
good law, then the federal courts must be available to federal prisoners. See Meltzer, supra
note 136, at 2566-67 (questioning the continuing vitality of Tarble).
141. See Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of
Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 108-10 (1998).
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and salary protection. 142 Since each state court system is answerable to a
different sovereign, there is far less danger that they will all be transformed
in any one direction. 143 Though most state judges do not have tenure and
salary protection comparable to that enjoyed by Article III judges, people
can vote with their feet against abuses of power in any given state. In the
long run, the most dangerous threats to constitutional liberty may come not
from state courts who lack the same enthusiasm as federal courts for
innovative constitutional arguments. They may come instead from demands
for one or another kind of ideological purity on the federal bench. 14 4
B. Florida Prepaid and the Madisonian Compromise
Florida Prepaid presents the mirror image of the typical case
concerning congressional control over federal jurisdiction. The problem is
not, as with the Tax Injunction Act, whether Congress may restrict federal
jurisdiction and oblige litigants to go to the state courts. Rather, Congress
attempted to broaden federal jurisdiction to include suits to recover damages
from state governments for patent infringement. The Supreme Court's
response was equally atypical. Rather than resting on the principle that the
allocation of jurisdiction is a matter for Congress to decide, the Court struck
down the Patent Remedy Act on the ground that it was not "appropriate"
legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 5 In my view, this ruling
deserves criticism, for it violates the "Congressional control" principle and
cannot be justified by any special considerations relating to Section 5.
One rationale for judicial deference to Congress on jurisdictional
matters draws on the text and history of the Constitution. The scope of the
federal judiciary was an issue at the 1787 convention. Though the need for a
Supreme Court was generally accepted, proponents of strong state
142. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
57-60, 73-76 (1982) (plurality opinion).
143. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the
New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. L.J. 297, 304-05 (1981) (noting that
assigning judicial business to non-Article III federal officers threatens the separation of
powers, but channeling it to the state courts does not do so).
144. A President who managed to transform the federal courts in his ideological image
may, with the aid of Congress, also shift jurisdiction over some constitutional claims to the
federal courts. But practical considerations, in particular the fact that many constitutional
issues are raised as defenses to state enforcement actions, limit the utility of this maneuver.
See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 605, 608-21 (1981).
145. See Florida Prepaid, 119 U.S. at 2206-1I.
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government resisted efforts by nationalists to create a formidable system of
lower federal courts. James Madison brokered a compromise, by which the
issue is left to Congress. 146 Thus, Article III vests "[t]he judicial Power of
the United States... in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 147 In Sheldon v.
Sill,14 8 the Court reasoned that the power over whether to create lower
federal courts implied the power to decide their jurisdiction, within the
bounds of Article Ill.
Judicial deference to Congress on jurisdictional matters is not solely a
matter of history. Leaving these decisions up to Congress implements a
basic principle of federalism first articulated by Madison, 149 championed
nearly fifty years ago by Herbert Wechsler1 50 and elaborated across a range
of issues by Jesse Choper and Laurence Tribe. 15 1 Madison pointed out that
Congress would be sensitive to state concerns since the members of
Congress must answer to state electorates. For Choper and Tribe, Congress'
accountability is a good reason to leave decisions about states' rights to
Congress. Courts should spend their political capital on other matters,
vindicating values that are less likely to get a respectful hearing from the
majoritarian branches of government.
Determining the scope of federal jurisdiction requires that one or
another branch of the national government make decisions as to the
allocation of power between the federal courts and the state governments. It
is unwise to leave these decisions to the federal courts, because federal
judges may not take due account of the interests of the states in making
them. Congress, on the other hand, is a body with both a national and a local
orientation. Because Congress is made up of representatives from all over
the country, it will not likely favor any particular parochial interest. At the
146. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 45, 52-56 (1975).
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
148. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
149. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (James Madison), No. 46, at 296 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
150. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLtJM. L. REV. 543,
546(1954).
151. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 682, 695 (1976).
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same time, the makeup of Congress should assure that it takes account of the
concerns of the states in choosing between federal and state jurisdiction. If
this theory of federalism is right, the implications for Florida Prepaid are
plain. In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress decided to put the
interests of patent holders in a federal remedy ahead of state interests in
handling these matters in the state courts. The states' constitutional
objection to the legislation lacks force, simply because the states' interests
are adequately represented in Congress, where they lost a fair political fight.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court ignored these arguments in favor of
congressional control, relying instead on its understanding of the
constitutional limits on Congress' Section 5 power. Section 5 authorizes
only "appropriate" remedial legislation, which means that Congress "must
identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing
such conduct." 152 Because Congress "identified no pattern of patent
infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations," 153 the legislation failed to pass muster.
A problem with the Court's reasoning, noted earlier, 154 is that its limits
on Congress' Section 5 power lack a strong normative foundation to counter
the Madisonian argument for deference to Congress. Having reaffirmed
Fitzpatrick, the Court could not invoke sovereign immunity and turned
instead to its decision two years earlier in Flores.155 But it could not rely on
the reasoning of Flores, which had stressed the limits on Congress' power to
go beyond remedial measures and impose substantive regulations-for the
Patent Remedy Act was primarily remedial. 156 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
solution was to quote the language of Flores on the need for "congruence
and proportionality," 157 while ignoring the very different context in which
Flores employed that standard. 158
Though the Florida Prepaid opinion does not say so, the real basis for
the holding may be the current anti-federalist majority's general policy of
152. 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
155. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
156. It is true that the Patent Remedy Act would allow someone to recover for
negligent infringement, which evidently is not a constitutional violation. See Florida Prepaid,
119 S. Ct. at 2209-10. A fair reading of the opinion, however, is that the Court's main
concern is the absence of a showing by Congress that a federal statute was necessary to
remedy deliberate violations. See also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
157. 119 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 520).
158. See id. at 2217-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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protecting states against Congress. Let us concede, for the sake of pursuing
this theme, that the argument for deference to Congress may not always be
compelling. There may be good reasons to retain some judicial protection of
states against Congress. First, some scholars advance textualist and
originalist arguments in favor of judicial protection of the states.159 Second,
there may be persuasive functional reasons for maintaining a sphere of state
autonomy. 160 Third, even if Congress could once be counted on to give
adequate consideration to state interests, things have changed since 1787.
Modem communication and transportation networks have made it harder for
states to retain their identities. In contrast to earlier eras, Congress in the
past thirty years has repeatedly subjected states to increased regulation. One
important feature of the original constitution, designed to assure the
influence of the states in Congress, was that senators were elected by state
legislatures. The Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, provides for
popular election of senators, thereby diluting senators' loyalty to the
governments of the states from which they come. 161 Seminole Tribe, Alden,
and other state-protective rulings of recent years may be defensible on the
ground that the old structural safeguards no longer work.
Be that as it may, there is a fundamental difference between Florida
Prepaid and earlier anti-federalist cases. Congress' aim in enacting the
Patent Remedy Act was not to pursue some goal of the national government
at the expense of the states, as in other recent cases where the Court had
been sensitive to the states independence from federal control, 162 but to
vindicate our Fourteenth Amendment rights. "Before the Civil War... the
Constitution afforded individuals very limited protection against state
action."1 63 Even partisans of judicial protection of the states against
Congress recognize that congressional protection of individual rights stands
on stronger ground than other kinds of regulation of the states, simply
because "the Fourteenth Amendment represented a radical shift in the
159. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93
Nw. U. L. REV. 819 (1999); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1311 (1997).
160. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813
(1998).
16 1. See Rappaport, supra note 159, at 863-64.
162. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also cases cited supra note 4.
163. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (13th
ed. 1997).
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balance between federal and state power."'164 Notwithstanding the structural
argument for judicial deference to Congress in states' rights cases, it may be
appropriate for the Court to protect states against congressional
overreaching for the sake of some national policy like gun control or
disposal of radioactive waste. It is quite another thing for the Court to strike
down a statute like the Patent Remedy Act, in which Congress attempted to
vindicate individual rights against encroachments by the states. Here the
case for deference is compelling.
In Florida Prepaid, Justice Rehnquist stresses the lack of any showing
that state remedies were inadequate. 16 5 This aspect of the opinion is another
possible rationale for the outcome. The majority may take the view that
Congress cannot justify the imposition of suits against states for damages in
the federal courts unless state remedies are inadequate. Put aside the
difficulty of administering a standard that requires an evaluation of state
remedial systems and assume, for the sake of argument, that it can be done.
The basic problem with this rationale for the outcome in Florida Prepaid is
that the adequacy of state remedies is beside the point when the issue is
Congress' power to allocate jurisdiction.
The origins of the Madisonian Compromise lie in the disparity between
federal and state courts. Even before federal courts existed, the framers
understood that they may be more sympathetic than state courts to claims
based on federal law. Otherwise there would have been nothing to fight
about and no need for a compromise. By treating the scope of federal
jurisdiction as a matter of legislative judgment, the framers left Congress
free to expand or contract the federal judicial power for the purpose of
securing more or less vigorous enforcement of federal rights. 16 6 For
example, the Tax Injunction Act was enacted because Congress thought
state courts were less likely to uphold constitutional challenges to state
taxes. 167 By the same token, Congress may legitimately assign patent suits
against state governments to the federal court because it prefers more
vigorous enforcement of patent rights, even if state remedies are
constitutionally adequate. 168
164. Yoo, supra note 159, at 1405 n. 10.
165. See 119 S. Ct. at 2208-09.
166. See Wells, supra note 133, at 473-74.
167. See Bator, supra note 135, at 1037.




Alden v. Mgine169 has received far more attention in the newspapers
than Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,170 perhaps because its rule forbidding Congress to authorize
suits against states in state court, coupled with Seminole Tribe, firmly and
decisively bars the recovery of damages against state governments for
violating federal statutes, no matter what the forum. Florida Prepaid merely
holds that a particular exercise of Section 5 power exceeds Congress' power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, for reasons that are not altogether
clear. It may also be relevant that the plaintiff in Florida Prepaid was a bank
and the right at stake was a patent, not the sort of litigation one tends to
associate with matters of high constitutional principle. Moreover, on the
surface the two cases seem to reflect the same value judgments in any event,
as each of them limits the power of Congress in favor of the states, in line
with Seminole Tribe and the rest of the "antifederalism revival of the
1990s."171 Each reflects the current majority's preference that constitutional
litigation against state governments take place in the state courts rather than
in federal court.
From the standpoint of constitutional remedies, however, Alden is
actually a positive development, for Seminole Tribe had called into question
the principle, established in Reich, that states must provide effective
remedies for constitutional violations when federal remedies are not
available. Alden reaffirmed Reich, distinguishing the constitutional remedy
at issue in Reich from the statutory cause of action under the FLSA the
plaintiff sought to enforce in Alden. On the other hand, Florida Prepaid
places new and weakly supported limits on Congress' power to remedy
conceded constitutional violations by authorizing suits for damages. The
opinion's lack of clarity merely highlights the potential danger. For
example, the Court notes the lack of a showing that state remedies were
"inadequate." 172 A court bent on restricting access to federal court could
turn this language into an all-purpose shield against Congress' exercise of
Section 5 power. 173
169. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
170. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
171. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 224.
172. 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
173. Some of the language in Florida Prepaid suggests that the Court's references to
the adequacy of state remedies means that no constitutional violation occurs unless state
remedies are inadequate. See id. ("Only where the State provides no remedy, or only
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Finally, Alden and Florida Prepaid, for all their surface similarity, differ
with regard to Congress' role in allocating jurisdiction between federal and
state courts. Alden's explanation of Reich depends on the premise that the
scope of federal jurisdiction is up to Congress. It is largely on account of
Congress' decision to remove state tax cases from the federal courts that the
state courts must hear them. Florida Prepaid overrides Congress' decision
to authorize a federal cause of action to enforce constitutional rights, while
ignoring all the good reasons, drawn from the states' representation in
Congress, for leaving allocation issues in Congress' hands.
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a
deprivation of property without due process result."). But that reading would put the case in
conflict with Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913)
(holding that a violation of the due process clause is complete when the official acts, even if
state remedies are available). See HART AND WECHSLER, Supp., supra note 49, at 105; Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 309, 352-55 (1993) (discussing the implications of Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 US. 527 (1981), a case upon which Florida Prepaid relies); Henry Paul
Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 979, 994-98 (1986).
Because Home Telephone is a landmark case setting forth a basic principle of
constitutional law and because the opinion in Florida Prepaid says nothing about Home
Telephone, it seems imprudent to infer that Florida Prepaid meant to overrule the earlier case.
For further discussion of this aspect of Florida Prepaid, see Michael Wells, "Available State
Remedies " and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).

